State aid and taxation: Can an antiavoidance provision be selective?
(2014) European State Aid Law Quarterly — Vol. 2014, n° 3, p. 516-525 (2014)
Files
Traversa_Comment_-C-6-12-POy_EStAL_2014.pdf
Posprint
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 173.28 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- (en) It is established case law that the prohibition of State aid does not only apply to aid in the form of direct subsidies, but also covers more indirect forms of aid, such as relief from fiscal andpara-fiscal levies.1 However,fourdecades afterthefamous Italian textilecase,2 uncertaintiesremainastothecriteriatobeusedtodeterminewhetheranapparentlyfavourable tax regime effectively constitutes State aid, i.e. has a selective nature. In recent years, the ECJ has issued several controversial judgments – sometimes spectacularly reversing decisionsoftheCourtofFirstInstance–concerningselectivityintaxaid,suchasBritishAggregates,3 Gibraltar4 andAzores.5 Thecommentedcase,althoughnotraisingasmanycritiques asthoselandmarkcases,6 presentssomeinterestingaspects,whichhaveledAdvocateGeneral Sharpston to qualify it as “curious” . It shows how difficult it can sometimes be for nationalcourtsnotonlytocorrectlyapplytheselectivitycriterion,inparticularasregardsthe determination of the relevant reference framework, but more generally to exactly understandtheextentoftheirmissionintheapplicationoftheStateaidrules.Moreover,itoffers interesting – if not worrisome – insights about the application of the State aid rules to domestic anti-avoidance tax provisions and their implementation by the tax administrations
- Affiliations
Citations
Traversa, E. (2014). State aid and taxation: Can an antiavoidance provision be selective? European State Aid Law Quarterly, 2014(3), 516-525. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/26067 (Original work published 2014)