Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition

Marchand, Maurice;Pestieau, Pierre;Sato, Motohiro
(2003) Journal of Urban Economics — Vol. 54, n° 3, p. 451-458 (2003)

Files

pdfdocument.pdf
  • Restricted Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 82.07 KB
No access

Details

Authors
  • Marchand, MauriceUCLouvain
    Author
  • Pestieau, PierreUliège
    Author
  • Sato, Motohiro
    Author
Abstract
Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal withholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Marchand, M., Pestieau, P., & Sato, M. (2003). Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(3), 451-458. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00057-3 (Original work published 2003)