Bribing votes: A new explanation to the “inequality-redistribution” puzzle in LDC’s

Docquier, Frédéric;Tarbalouti, Essaïd
(2001) Public Choice — Vol. 108, n° 3/4, p. 259-272 (2001)

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Authors
  • Docquier, FrédéricUCLouvain
    Author
  • Tarbalouti, EssaïdUniversity of Lille 2
    Author
Abstract
The recent empirical literature on redistribution and developmentemphasizes two main evidences: (i) more redistribution generallyinduces higher growth rates and (ii) more inequality does notnecessarily increase the political demand for redistribution.These stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observedin developed countries. Several theoretical arguments can beadvanced to explain these puzzles. In this paper, it is shownthat ``vote purchases'' may be seen as an additional argument toexplain puzzle (ii). We formalize this idea and examine theconditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle toredistribution (and thus to growth) in a developing economy.
Affiliations
  • Ministère de la région WalloneSES
  • University of Lille 2CADRE

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Docquier, F., & Tarbalouti, E. (2001). Bribing votes: A new explanation to the “inequality-redistribution” puzzle in LDC’s. Public Choice, 108(3/4), 259-272. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017515915450 (Original work published 2001)