In “TheMonetary GoldPrinciple: Back to Basics,” Zachary Mollengarden and Noam Zamir claim that the well-known principle runs against fundamental ICJ statutory provisions. It would “depart” from Article 36(1),“under-mine” Article 62,“import factors external” to Article 59 and “obscure . . . rather than illuminate . . . the relevantrules of law” contrary to Article 38(1). Additionally, the policy considerations upon which the principle is allegedlybased—compliance, due process, and legitimacy—would support its abolition, rather than its perpetuation. I argue that the authors’claims are unpersuasive in relation to Article 36 of the ICJ Statute (consent of theparties to adjudication) since they fail to distinguish between having jurisdiction in a case and exercising jurisdictionto decide a claim. The authors also overestimate the role of Article 62 in securing third-party interests, since onlyintervention as a party, rather than a non-party, is sufficient to overcome the Monetary Gold limitation
d’Argent, P. (2021). The Monetary Gold Principle: A Matter of Submissions. American Journal of International Law (Unbound), 2021(115), 149-153. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2021.13 (Original work published 2021)