Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph

De Stefano Grigis, Federico
(2014)

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  • De Stefano Grigis, FedericoUCLouvain
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Abstract
This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash equilibrium refinements and stochastic games as a tool to define a stable set of equilibria.
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De Stefano Grigis, F. (2014). Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/196468