There are now numerous published case-reports of brain-damaged patients presenting with a category-specific conceptual deficit. The most frequently reported pattern is the one in which patients have a selective or disproportionate impairment in processing the concepts of living things, but the reverse pattern, with the nonliving concepts being more impaired, has also been reported. The existence of such patterns of dissociation suggests that the conceptual system is organized on a categorical basis. However, according to the most widely accepted account for category-specific semantic deficits, these patterns in fact emerge as an accidental consequence of another organizing principle of semantic knowledge, namely, the kind of properties (sensorial or functional) being represented. This "sensori-functional" account of category-specific semantic deficits presented itself as superior to a categorical account on the basis of the following points: (1) the patterns of dissociation between impaired versus spared categories do not follow the living versus nonliving distinction; (2) these patterns can be accounted for by reference to the kind of properties (visual versus functional) that are relevant for a given class of concepts; (3) the patients with a selective deficit for living things also present with a selective deficit in processing the visual properties of concepts. Here we show that none of these points stand up to analysis of the empirical facts, which in addition are more consistent with the hypothesis of a categorical organization of the conceptual system.
Pillon, A., & Samson, D. (2003). Les troubles sémantiques catégoriels reflètent l’organisation catégorielle de la mémoire sémantique. Revue de Neuropsychologie, 13(1), 71-113. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/33867 (Original work published 2003)