Harmful competition in insurance markets
(2014) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization — Vol. 106, p. 213-226 (2014)
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- Abstract
- There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition that under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for different distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium.
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De Feo, G., & Hindriks, J. (2014). Harmful competition in insurance markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 106, 213-226. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.002 (Original work published 2014)