An equal right-solution to the compensation-responsibility dilemma

Maniquet, François
(1998) Mathematical Social Sciences — Vol. 35, p. 185-202 (1998)

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Abstract
In a simple production model where skills may differ among agents, we consider that skills are common resources, and we propose to give all agents an equal property right to both the technology and the skills. A class of welfare lower bounds is derived from this idea.We argue that the conflicting objectives of unequal skill compensation and preferences responsibility are partially achieved by allocation rules satisfying these welfare bounds. Combining them with other compensation or responsibility properties allows us to characterize two classes of allocation rules in a parallel fashion.
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Maniquet, F. (1998). An equal right-solution to the compensation-responsibility dilemma. Mathematical Social Sciences, 35, 185-202. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/174580 (Original work published 1998)