On blocking coalitions: linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

Greenberg, Joseph;Weber, Shlomo;Yamakazi, Akira
(2004)

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Authors
  • Greenberg, Joseph
    Author
  • Weber, ShlomoUCLouvain
    Author
  • Yamakazi, Akira
    Author
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Walrasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers [alpha], [beta], between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between [alpha] and [beta], is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.
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Greenberg, J., Weber, S., & Yamakazi, A. (2004). On blocking coalitions: linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind (CORE Discussion Papers 2004/60). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/39751