Incentives to innovate in oligopolies
(2006)
Files
2006-8.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 541.87 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotonic, different, and potentially opposite ways.
- Affiliations
Citations
Belleflamme, P., & Vergari, C. (2006). Incentives to innovate in oligopolies (ECON Discussion Papers 2006/08). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/35873