Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding

Belleflamme, Paul
(2015) , 13 pages

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Abstract
A monopolist can use a 'tracking' technology that allows it to identify a consumer's willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a `hiding' technology. We show in this note that consumers are collectively better off when this hiding technology is not available, even when consumers can acquire it free of charge.
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Belleflamme, P. (2015). Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding (CORE Discussion Papers 2015/42). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/189158