The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements
(2008) , 26 pages
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- Authors
van Ypersele de Strihou, Jean-Pascal 
- Abstract
- In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate agreements. We compare a minus 20 percent unilateral commitment strategy by the EU with a unilateral minus 30 percent emission reduction strategy for all Annex-B countries. Using a numerical integrated assessment climate-economy simulation model, we find that carbon leakage effects are negligible. The EU strategy to reduce emissions by 30% (compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 if other Annex-B countries follow does not induce participation of the USA with a similar 30% reduction commitment. However, the model shows that an appropriate initial allocation of emission allowances may stabilize a larger and more ambitious climate coalition than the Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
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Citations
Bréchet, T., Eyckmans, J., Gérard, F., Marbaix, P., Tulkens, H., & van Ypersele de Strihou, J.-P. (2008). The impact of the unilateral EU commitment on the stability of international climate agreements (CORE Discussion Papers 2008/61).