The Governance of Contracts : Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements
(2006) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics — Vol. 163, n° 2, p. 205-235 (2006)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- This paper provides new evidence on the contractual governance of technology licensing agreements. Based upon an international sample of licensing contracts, we explore how the contractual design deals with specific contractual hazards. In particular, we comparatively assess the influences of transaction attributes, institutional frameworks and strategic considerations on licensing design. Empirical results highlight that contractual clauses of governance are crafted independently of each other. This leads to a discussion about complementarities among contractual components, which is frequently assumed in theory. Furthermore, our results are certainly amongst the first to provide econometric evidence on the pervasive influence of private institutions in technology trade.
- Affiliations
Louvain School of Management Strategy and Organisation
Citations
Brousseau, E., Chaserant, C., & Coeurderoy, R. (2006). The Governance of Contracts : Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing Agreements. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 163(2), 205-235. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250747 (Original work published 2006)