The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements

Dehez, Pierre;Poukens-Renwart, Sophie
(2014) Review of Law & Economics — Vol. 10, n° 3, p. 265-284 (2014)

Files

Rep2645.pdf
  • Closed Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 2.73 MB
Request a copy

Details

Authors
  • Dehez, PierreUCLouvain
    Author
  • Poukens-Renwart, SophieUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
We consider the problem faced by standard-setting organizations of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents that have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to these "weak" patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements could look like. This is a revised version of CORE Discussion Paper 2013-12. Reprint of the published paper available upon request.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Dehez, P., & Poukens-Renwart, S. (2014). The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements. Review of Law & Economics, 10(3), 265-284. https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2013-0016 (Original work published 2014)