Secession-proofness in large heterogeneous societies
(2005) Economie publique — Vol. 17, n° 2, p. 197-220 (2005)
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- Abstract
- This paper examines the model of multi-jurisdictional formation considered by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Le Breton and Weber (2003), where the distribution of individuals is given by Lebesgue measure over a bounded interval. Every jurisdiction chooses a location of a public good and shares its cost of production among its residents. In addition, each individual incurs a transportation cost. We consider a notion of secession-proof allocation where no group of individuals can make all its members better or by choosing both a location of the public good and a cost-sharing mechanism among its own members. We examine secession-proof allocations and show that they may fail to satisfy some desirable requirements, including the Rawlsian principle. We show however that secession-proofness can be reconciled with an approximate Rawlsian principle in large societies.
- Affiliations
Université Toulouse I Département d'économie
Citations
Le Breton, M., Weber, S., & Dreze, J. (2005). Secession-proofness in large heterogeneous societies. Economie publique, 17(2), 197-220. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/35963 (Original work published 2005)