Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Barham, V.;Boadway, R.;Marchand, Maurice;Pestieau, Pierre
(1997) Journal of Public Economics — Vol. 65, n° 1, p. 9-22 (1997)

Files

pdfdocument.pdf
  • Restricted Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 695.71 KB
Request a copy

Details

Authors
  • Barham, V.
    Author
  • Boadway, R.
    Author
  • Marchand, MauriceUCLouvain
    Author
  • Pestieau, PierreUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analyzed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive non-pecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Barham, V., Boadway, R., Marchand, M., & Pestieau, P. (1997). Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality. Journal of Public Economics, 65(1), 9-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00003-0 (Original work published 1997)