Coordination on formal vs. De Facto standards : a dynamic approach

Belleflamme, Paul
(2002) European Journal of Political Economy — Vol. 18, n° 1, p. 153-176 (2002)

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Abstract
Formal standards arise out of deliberations of standards-writing organizations, while de facto standards result from unfettered market processes. Therefore, the former are of a higher quality and legitimacy but are slower to develop than the latter. To address this trade-off, we analyze a dynamic game where two players choose between one evolving formal standard and one mature de facto standard. The outcome of the game relies on the coordination mechanism used by the players on the relative value they attach to successful coordination and on the formal standard's performance at the end of the game.
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Belleflamme, P. (2002). Coordination on formal vs. De Facto standards : a dynamic approach. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(1), 153-176. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00073-8 (Original work published 2002)