Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy

Minelli, Enrico;Polemarchakis, Heracles M.
(1999)

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  • Minelli, Enrico
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  • Polemarchakis, Heracles M.
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Abstract
Individuals exchange contracts for the deliveryof commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directlyor through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash-Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utilityfunctions are not quasi - concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
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Minelli, E., & Polemarchakis, H. M. (1999). Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy (CORE Discussion Papers 1999/43). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/78248