Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

Haimanko, O
(2002) Journal of Economic Theory — Vol. 106, n° 1, p. 17-39 (2002)

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  • Haimanko, O
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Abstract
We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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Haimanko, O. (2002). Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies. Journal of Economic Theory, 106(1), 17-39. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2826 (Original work published 2002)