Long term locational prices and investment incentives in the transmission of electricity
(2005)
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- Abstract
- We present a model of generation and network investment in a competitive electricity system. The model focuses on the duality of long-and short-term locational signals introduced in the European Regulation 1228/2003 for enhancing cross border trade of electricity among Member States. The model assumes that the market consists of spot and transmission submarkets. Generators, consumers and a TSO operate on that market; none of these agents has market power. Lumpiness of investments is one of the problems that may render generation and network adequacy difficult to achieve. We take up this question and apply some formalism formerly developed by O'Neill and co-authors for the unit commitment problem in order to construct multipart tariffs that insure the adequate development of the resources both in generation and the grid. In the process, we recover the standard nodal pricing as part of that multipart tariff. We address the questions of cost reflectiveness and non discrimination imposed by Regulation 1228/2003.
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Citations
Smeers, Y. (2005). Long term locational prices and investment incentives in the transmission of electricity (CORE Discussion Papers 2005/30). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/77210