Competition for market share or for market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying competitive toughness

d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude;Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe;Gerard Varet, Louis-André
(2007) International Economic Review — Vol. 48, n° 3, p. 761-784 (2007)

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  • d'Aspremont-Lynden, ClaudeUCLouvain
    Author
  • Dos Santos Ferreira, RodolpheUCLouvain
    Author
  • Gerard Varet, Louis-André
    Author
Abstract
For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability.
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d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., Dos Santos Ferreira, R., & Gerard Varet, L.-A. (2007). Competition for market share or for market size: oligopolistic equilibria with varying competitive toughness. International Economic Review, 48(3), 761-784. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00444.x (Original work published 2007)