Towards security limits in side-channel attacks (with an application to block ciphers)
(2006) 8th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2006) — Location: Yokohama(Japan) (10.October.2006)
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- Abstract
- In this paper, we consider a recently introduced framework that investigates physically observable implementations from a theoretical point of view. The model allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. More specifically, we apply our evaluation methodology to an exemplary block cipher. We first consider a Hamming weight leakage function and evaluate the efficiency of two commonly investigated countermeasures, namely noise addition and masking. Then, we show that the proposed methodology allows capturing certain non-trivial intuitions, e.g. about the respective effectiveness of these countermeasures. Finally, we justify the need of combined metrics for the evaluation, comparison and understanding of side-channel attacks.
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Citations
Standaert, F.-X., Quisquater, J.-J., Peeters, E., & Archambeau, C. (2006). Towards security limits in side-channel attacks (with an application to block ciphers). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4249, 30-45. https://doi.org/10.1007/11894063_3 (Original work published 2006)