Social security and retirement decision: A positive and normative approach
(2006)
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- Abstract
- Social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or in a first-best setting, there would be no such trend. However, when first-best instruments are not available, because health and productivity are not observable, the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision. The main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early in many countries, a complete elimination of this bias (i.e., a switch to an actuarially fair system) is not the right answer. This is so and for two reasons. First, some distortions are secondbest optimal. This is the normative argument. Second, and on the positive side, the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective. Depending on the political process, it may either not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself.
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Citations
Cremer, H., Lozachmeur, J.-M., & Pestieau, P. (2006). Social security and retirement decision: A positive and normative approach (CORE Discussion Papers 2006/19). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/80944