There is a wide range of economic problems involving the exchange of indivisible goods without monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper of Shapley and Scarf [10] and including other problems like the kidney exchange or the school choice problems. For many of these models, the classical solution is the application of an algorithm/mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, that generalizes the Top Trading Cycles for the general case in which individuals can report indifferences, and preserves all its desirable properties.
Affiliations
Universidad del Pais VascoDepartment of Applied Economics
Citations
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Chicago
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Alcalde-Unzu, J., & Molis Banales, E. (2009). Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms (CORE Discussion Papers 2009/62). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250145