Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences

De Donder, Philippe;Hindriks, Jean
(2004) Public Choice — Vol. 118, n° 3-4, p. 437-449 (2004)

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  • De Donder, PhilippeUniversite de Toulouse
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  • Hindriks, JeanUCLouvain
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Abstract
This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when income is fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasible taxes is compact and self-interested voters have corner preferences. We first show that, if a majority winning tax policy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then give a necessary and suficient condition on the income distribution for a majority winner to exist. This condition appears to be satisfied for a large class of distribution functions.
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De Donder, P., & Hindriks, J. (2004). Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences. Public Choice, 118(3-4), 437-449. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019907.16784.cb (Original work published 2004)