investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model
(1997) Journal of Economics — Vol. 66, n° 3, p. 223-247 (NaN) (1997)
Files
je-jff-mg.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 1.15 MB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- We analyse the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological pre-commitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behaviour induces a non-monotonic relationship between the capital-and-labour demands of the firm and most of her environmental parameters (a.o. the bargaining power of the union, her minimum wage requirement, the capital cost,...). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradicts several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.
- Affiliations
Citations
Fagnart, J.-F., & Germain, M. (1997). investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model. Journal of Economics, 66(3), 223-247 (NaN). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01226827 (Original work published 1997)