A chain oligopoly model of merger strategies and competition
(2000) Chain Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference, Wageningen, 25-26 May 2000 — ISBN: [90-74134-82-3], p. 507-516, published
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- Abstract
- Competition along an agri-food chain is analysed with the use of a chain oligopoly model. This model includes an oligopoly facing an oligopsony, which are solved simultaneously. The results of standard industrial organization models are altered when oligopoly-oligopsony is modelled simultaneously. Verifying the countervailing power hypothesis, it is shown that it is not always profitable to exercise market power when there are firms with market power on the other side of the market. It is also shown that there are more powerful incentives for vertical than horizontal mergers in the case of chain oligopolies. The merger between MD FOODS and KLØVER MAELK in Denmark highlights several of the issues involved.
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Agrell, P. J., Karantininis, K., & Oustapassidis, K. (2000). A chain oligopoly model of merger strategies and competition. In J.H. Trienekens, P.J.P. Zuurbier (ed.), Chain Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry : Proceedings of the 4th International Conference, Wageningen, 25-26 May 2000 (p. p. 507-516). Wageningen Pers. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/162061