Analyzing the Leakage Resistance of the NIST’s Lightweight Crypto Competition’s Finalists
(2022) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications 2th International Conference, CARDIS 2022 — (2022)
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- Abstract
- We investigate the security of the NIST Lightweight Crypto Competition’s Finalists against side-channel attacks. We start with a mode-level analysis that allows us to put forward three candidates (As- con, ISAP and Romulus-T) that stand out for their leakage properties and do not require a uniform protection of all their computations thanks to (expensive) implementation-level countermeasures. We then imple- ment these finalists and evaluate their respective performances. Our re- sults confirm the interest of so-called leveled implementations (where only the key derivation and tag generation require security against dif- ferential power analysis). They also suggest that these algorithms differ more by their qualitative features (e.g., two-pass designs to improve confi- dentiality with decryption leakage vs. one-pass designs, flexible overheads thanks to masking vs. fully mode-level, easier to implement, schemes) than by their quantitative features, which all improve over the AES and are quite sensitive to security margins against cryptanalysis.
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Citations
Verhamme, C., Cassiers, G., & Standaert, F.-X. (2022). Analyzing the Leakage Resistance of the NIST’s Lightweight Crypto Competition’s Finalists. Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications 2th International Conference, CARDIS 2022. Accepted/in-press. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/103579 (Original work published 2022)