The Agency of European Energy Regulators (ACER) established by the EC regulation 713/2009, as a fundamental part of the Third Energy Package. In this paper, we analyse ACER as a vertical regulation device for energy network regulation. The effectiveness of ACER is not guaranteed by institutional design, but depends on the collective decision-making of the national regulators. We propose a gametheoretic model with three types of players, Good, Bad and Ugly, depending on their specification of their respective welfare functions. A globally welfare-increasing equlibrium is found only for a majority of Good actors, which is empirically uncertain.
Louvain School of ManagementOperations and Information
UCLouvainSSH/ILSM/ILSM - Research Institute of Louvain School of Management
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Agrell, P. J. (2009). Three Strikes and Out: ACER and the Means, Ends and Limits of Regulatory Coordination. Smart EU Energy Policy Workshop, Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), Den Haag. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/250507