Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager - physician interaction

Crainich, David;Leleu, Hervé;Mauleon, Ana
(2006) , 20 pages

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Authors
  • Crainich, David
    Author
  • Leleu, Hervé
    Author
  • Author
Abstract
Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.
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Citations

Crainich, D., Leleu, H., & Mauleon, A. (2006). Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager - physician interaction (CEREC Working Paper 2006/04).