Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity ?

Casamatta, Georges;Cremer, Helmuth;Pestieau, Pierre
(2006) Economics of Governance — Vol. 7, n° 2, p. 143-154 (2006)

Files

pdfdocument.pdf
  • Restricted Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 177.24 KB
No access

Details

Authors
  • Casamatta, Georges
    Author
  • Cremer, Helmuth
    Author
  • Pestieau, PierreUliège
    Author
Abstract
In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Casamatta, G., Cremer, H., & Pestieau, P. (2006). Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity ? Economics of Governance, 7(2), 143-154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-005-0001-9 (Original work published 2006)