How lotteries outperform auctions

Bos, Olivier
(2010) Economics Letters — Vol. 110, n° 3, p. 262-264 (2011)

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  • Bos, OlivierUniversité Panthéon-Assas (Paris II)
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Abstract
In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.
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Bos, O. (2010). How lotteries outperform auctions. Economics Letters, 110(3), 262-264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.025 (Original work published 2011)