La conscience imaginée
(2000) Revue Philosophique de Louvain — Vol. 98, n° 4, p. 761-782 (2000)
Files
pdfdocument.pdf
Restricted Access - Adobe PDF
- 91.77 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- Once one rejects the interactionist dualism as a theory of the mind, the concept of quale yields a contradiction. Qua phenomenal data of consciousness it refers to an intrinsic property not explainable in terms of the natural sciences; qua data of subjective experience a quale is for the subject and must therefore be functionally efficient. In order to shun this paradox Daniel Dennett suggests challenging our intuitions concerning consciousness and setting up a new explanatory frame that would make it possible to develop a theory without the concept of quale. Though the model defended by Dennett presents several difficulties it interestingly represents an invitation to review the language-games we use to conceive consciousness.
- Affiliations
Citations
Leyens, S. (2000). La conscience imaginée. Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 98(4), 761-782. https://doi.org/10.2143/RPL.98.4.542009 (Original work published 2000)