Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination

Rodrik, D;Van Ypersele, Tanguy
(2001) Journal of International Economics — Vol. 54, n° 1, p. 57-73 (2001)

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  • Rodrik, D
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  • Van Ypersele, Tanguy
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Abstract
Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as with free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
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Rodrik, D., & Van Ypersele, T. (2001). Captial mobility, distributive conflict and international tax coordination. Journal of International Economics, 54(1), 57-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00088-X (Original work published 2001)