Estimating the shirking model with variable effort
(2003)
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- Abstract
- We show in a theoretical efficiency wage model where firms differ in monitoring intensity or in the effort intensity of their technologies that the impact of monitoring intensity on wages is ambiguous, a result that mirrors evidence from the empirical literature. We argue that to correctly specify the impact of monitoring on wages, the interaction between monitoring and effort needs to be modelled. Results using a worker, firm panel from Ghana which contains reasonable effort and monitoring proxies show that the return to effort is higher in poorly monitored sectors as the theory suggests.
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Citations
Strobl, E., & Walsh, F. (2003). Estimating the shirking model with variable effort (ECON Discussion Papers 2003/79). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/129054