Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
(1978) International Journal of Game Theory — Vol. 7, n° 3-4, p. 201-221 (1978)
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- Abstract
- In this paper the authors propose a class of games, the `strategically zero-sum games', which are characterized by a special payoff structure. They show that for a large body of correlation schemes which includes the correlated strategies `a la Aumann', strategically zero-sum games are exactly these games for which no completely mixed Nash equilibrium can be improved upon.
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Moulin, H., & Vial, J.-P. (1978). Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory, 7(3-4), 201-221. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/149128 (Original work published 1978)