Power and electromagnetic based side-channel attacks are serious threats against the security of cryptographic embedded devices. In order to mitigate these attacks, implementations use countermeasures, among which masking is currently the most investigated and deployed choice. Unfortunately, commonly studied forms of masking rely on underlying assumptions that are difficult to satisfy in practice. This is due to physical defaults, such as glitches or transitions, which can recombine the masked data in a way that concretely reduces an implementation's security. We develop and implement an automated approach for verifying security of masked implementations in presence of physical defaults (glitches or transitions). Our approach helps to recover the main strengths of masking: rigorous foundations, composability guarantees, automated verification under more realistic assumptions. Our work follows the approach of (Barthe et al, EUROCRYPT 2015) and thus contributes to demonstrate the benefits of language-based approaches (specifically probabilistic information ow) for masking.
Barthe, G., Belaïd, S., Cassiers, G., Fouque, P.-A., Grégoire, B., & Standaert, F.-X. (2019). maskVerif: Automated Verification of Higher-Order Masking in Presence of Physical Defaults. In Kazue Sako, Steve Schneider, Peter Y. A. Ryan (ed.), Proceedings of the 24th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2019) (p. p. 300-318). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0