Yet Another Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol that is Broken

Avoine, Gildas;Carpent, Xavier
(2012) RFIDSec′12 — Location: Nijmegen, Netherlands (1.July.2012)

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Authors
  • Avoine, GildasUCLouvain
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  • Carpent, XavierUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
Eghdamian and Samsudin published at ICIEIS 2011 an ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol that requires few bitwise operations. The simplicity of the design makes the protocol very suitable to low-cost RFID tags. However, we demonstrate in this paper that the long-term key shared by the reader and the tag can be recovered by an adversary with a few eavesdropped sessions only. Additionally, we provide the backbone of some attacks on a series of similar recent protocols, and highlight important common weaknesses in the design of ultralightweight protocols.
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Avoine, G., & Carpent, X. (2012). Yet Another Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol that is Broken. In Jaap-Henk Hoepman (ed.), Workshop on RFID Security. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36140-1_2