Cooperative production: A comparison of welfare bounds

Fleurbaey, Marc;Maniquet, François
(1996) Games and Economic Behavior — Vol. 17, n° 2, p. 200-208 (1996)

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Abstract
In the production model with a one-input]one-output technology, we study welfare lower bounds that give a guarantee of welfare to each agent independent of the others’ preferences. We obtain characterizations of egalitarian-equivalent allocation rules on the basis of two weak lower bounds, in striking contrast with Moulin’s characterization of the equal budget Walrasian solution on a slightly smaller domain with a more demanding lower bound.
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Fleurbaey, M., & Maniquet, F. (1996). Cooperative production: A comparison of welfare bounds. Games and Economic Behavior, 17(2), 200-208. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0102 (Original work published 1996)