Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation

De Sinopoli, Francesco;Iannantuoni, Giovanna
(2001)

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco
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  • Iannantuoni, Giovanna
    Author
Abstract
In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters' behavior on the equilibrium outcome, for which strategic voters cannot fully adjust.
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De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2001). Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation (CORE Discussion Papers 2001/29). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/128254