Rationing in the presence of baselines

Hougaard, Jens Leth Hougaard;Moreno-Ternero, Juan de Dios;Osterdal, Lars Peter
(2012) Social Choice and Welfare — Vol. 40, n° 4, p. 1047-1066 (2013)

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Authors
  • Hougaard, Jens Leth HougaardUniversity of Copenhagen
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  • Moreno-Ternero, Juan de DiosUniversidad Pablo de Olavide
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  • Osterdal, Lars PeterUniversity of Southern Denmark
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Abstract
We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines,in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for this model. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some focal properties, the former obeys them too.
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Hougaard, J. L. H., Moreno-Ternero, J. d. D., & Osterdal, L. P. (2012). Rationing in the presence of baselines. Social Choice and Welfare, 40(4), 1047-1066. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0664-4 (Original work published 2013)