Politiques fiscales optimales pour les bas revenus et principe de compensation
(2015) Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales — Vol. 66, n° 3, p. 579-600 (2015)
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- We consider an economy in which agents differ in terms of productivity (that may be either high or low) as well as in their preferences for labour. Individuals decide whether or not they enter the labour force. In this context and under asymmetric information, the optimal tax schedules derived under the Egalitarian Equivalence criterion (Fleurbaey et Maniquet [2005], [2006]) always satisfy the compensation principle (for distinct productivity levels). Under the criterion of Roemer [1993], [1998] and the weighted maximin à la Boadway et al. [2002], the optimal tax schedules may satisfy the compensation principle while the standard criteria in the optimal taxation literature fail to do so. Numerical simulations illustrate our analytical results.
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Jacquet, L., & Van de Gaer, D. (2015). Politiques fiscales optimales pour les bas revenus et principe de compensation. Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 66(3), 579-600. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/190139 (Original work published 2015)