Delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information

Cremer, Helmuth;Pestieau, Pierre
(1998) Southern Economic Journal — Vol. 65, n° 2, p. 322-330 (1998)

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Authors
  • Cremer, HelmuthUCLouvain
    Author
  • Pestieau, PierreUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic patents prefer late bequests to early inter-vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.
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Cremer, H., & Pestieau, P. (1998). Delaying inter vivos transmissions under asymmetric information. Southern Economic Journal, 65(2), 322-330. https://doi.org/10.2307/1060671 (Original work published 1998)