Rank estimation algorithms allow analyzing the computational security of cryptographic keys for which adversaries have obtained partial information thanks to leakage or cryptanalysis. They are particularly useful in side-channel security evaluations, where the key is known by the evaluator but not reachable with exhaustive search. A first instance of such algorithms has been proposed at Eurocrypt 2013. In this paper, we propose a new tool for rank estimation that is conceptually simpler and much more efficient than this previous proposal. It allows approximating the key rank of (128-bit, 256-bit) symmetric keys with very tight bounds (i.e. with less than one bit of error), almost instantaneously and with limited memory. It also scales nicely to larger (e.g. 1024-bit) key sizes, for which the previous algorithm was hardly applicable.
Glowacz, C., Grosso, V., Poussier, R., Schüth, J., & Standaert, F.-X. (2015). Simpler and More Efficient Rank Estimation for Side-Channel Security Assessment. In Gregor Leander (ed.), Proceedings of the 22nd International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (FSE 2015) (p. p. 117-129). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5