The Kyoto Protocol: an Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation
(2006) Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition — ISBN: [978-0-387-25533-0], published
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- Authors
van Ypersele de Strihou, Jean-Pascal 
- Abstract
- The twenty-two papers collected in this volume illustrate the itinerary of Henry Tulkens, an applied theorist, on the occasion of his retirement from teaching. The collection is structured in four parts: I. Decentralized resource allocation processes for public and private goods II. Environment, public goods and externalities III. Efficiency analysis IV. Fiscal competition and optimality The four pictures above evoke a key concept, method or model used in each of these four parts: > MDP-type processes to determine feasible paths to efficiency and coalitional stability. > CLIMNEG World Simulation model to explore alternative environmental scenarios for the planet. > Free Disposal Hull efficiency analysis to drop convexity and help deal with outliers. > Non Cooperative Fiscal Equilbria to characterize the outcomes of fiscal competition
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Citations
van Ypersele de Strihou, J.-P. (2006). The Kyoto Protocol: an Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation. In Henry Tulkens (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition. Springer. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/58517