Cores of games with positive externalities
(2010)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- This paper introduces a core concept, called the γ-core, in the primitive framework of a strategic game. For a certain class of strategic games, it is a weaker concept than the strong Nash equilibrium, but in general stronger than the conventional α- and β- cores. We argue that the coalition formation process is an infinitely repeated game and show that the grand coalition forms if the γ-core is nonempty. This is a weaker sufficient condition than the previous such condition (Maskin (2003, Theorem 4)). As an application of this result, it is shown that the γ- core of an oligopolistic market is nonempty and thus the grand coalition forms.
- Affiliations
National University of Singapore Department of Economics
Citations
Chander, P. (2010). Cores of games with positive externalities (CORE Discussion Paper 2010/4). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/249810