Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates
(2001)
Files
dp2001-50.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 252.32 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D and product market competition. We provide a thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification, derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.
- Affiliations
Citations
Amir, R., Evstigneev, I., & Wooders, J. (2001). Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates (CORE Discussion Papers 2001/50). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/44010