Export Cartels and Stability : The Japanese Case

Jacquemin, Alexis;Nambu, Tsuruhiko;Dewez, Isabelle
(1979) , 26 pages

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Authors
  • Jacquemin, AlexisUCLouvain
    Author
  • Nambu, TsuruhikoGakushuin University
    Author
  • Dewez, IsabelleUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
(en) The success of a cartel depends upon at least two main elements : its members should earn higher revenues than from any feasible alternative including competition; and it should be capable of solving its organizational problems such as defining the area of collusion, enforcing the agreement, which includes means of determining and detecting cheating, and specifying the distribution of gains among its members. There exists a link between these two aspects since the potential for profits determines the capability of the cartel's bearing the costs of maintaining collusion (see, for example Pindyck (1979) and Osborne (1976)).
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Citations

Jacquemin, A., Nambu, T., & Dewez, I. (1979). Export Cartels and Stability : The Japanese Case (Working Papers Institut des sciences économiques 7911). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/278798