Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen.

Surtees, Andrew;Samson, Dana;Apperly, Ian
(2016) Cognition — Vol. 148, p. 97-105 (2016)

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Authors
  • Surtees, Andrew
    Author
  • Samson, DanaUCLouvain
    Author
  • Apperly, Ian
    Author
Abstract
A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as "level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as "level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspective-taking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.
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Citations

Surtees, A., Samson, D., & Apperly, I. (2016). Unintentional perspective-taking calculates whether something is seen, but not how it is seen. Cognition, 148, 97-105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.010 (Original work published 2016)