In his Scientific Representation. Paradoxes of Perspective (2008), Bas van Fraassen offers a pragmatic account of scientific representation and representation tout court. In this paper I examine the three conditions for a user to succeed in representing a target in some context: identification of the target of the representational action, representing the target as such and such and correctly representing it in some respects. I argue that success on these three counts relies on the supposed truth of some predicative assertions, and thus that truth is more fundamental than representation. I do this in the framework of a version of the so-called “structural” account of representation according to which the establishment of a homomorphism by the user between a structure abstracted from the intended target and some relevant structure of the representing artefact is a necessary (although certainly not sufficient) condition of success for representing the target in some respects. Finally, on the basis of a correspondence view (not theory) of truth, I show that it is possible to address what van Fraassen calls “the loss of reality objection”.
Ghins, M. (2016). Bas van Fraassen on success and adequacy in representing and modelling. In Claudia Casadio and Lorenzo Magnani (ed.) (ed.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Theoretical and Cognitive Issues. (p. p. 21-42). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38983-7_2